



BREEAM HEA 06 SAFETY AND SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Security of Site and
Building

For

PALMER PARK
SPORTS CENTRE

2630-1-PCL
November 2020, Revision 00

Version Control

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
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18 November 2020

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Date

18 November 2020



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
1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

- 1.1.1 This report summarises the Security Needs Assessment (SNA) carried out for the proposed development of a new Leisure Centre and Hub at the Palmer Park Sports Centre located just off Wokingham Road, Reading, RG6 1LF.
- 1.1.2 The Safety and Security Assessment has been carried out by Nick Johnson of IJA Security Consultants (Ian Johnson Associates Limited). As an independent Security Consultant with nearly 20 years' experience, and a member of The Association of Security Consultants, Nick Johnson is a Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS), and has carried out an evidence based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent).
- 1.1.3 This SNA report details the findings from a review of the current design proposals to identify the security threats and risks and develop this security needs assessment. The report provides site specific recommendations intended for consideration by the design team. It is our expectation that the contents herein will support the planning, design and specifications to ensure the safety and security issues identified are suitably mitigated.

1.2 Development Location

- 1.2.1 Palmer Park Stadium is located within the grounds of Palmer Park to the east of Reading and sandwiched between the A329 Wokingham Road and the A3290.



1.3 Requirement

- 1.3.1 The proposed development includes a new Leisure Centre and Hub that will adjoin the existing Athletics Club building and provide additional leisure facilities for members including a swimming pool, soft play activity area, café, gym and fitness studios. The immediate area and access to the Park will also be redesigned to incorporate a new car parking layout and associated landscaping.

1.4 The Security Needs Assessment (SNA)

- 1.4.1 The Security Needs Assessment is a project and site specific assessment of security needs, including:
- Identifying risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the building(s).
 - Identifying risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential user groups of the building(s).
 - Identifying any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.
- 1.4.2 Note: this Assessment was conducted in early November 2020 during a period when the UK was under a national lockdown due to the COVID-19 crisis and as a consequence was carried out as a desk top assessment based on a review of proposed drawings, online research and discussions with key stakeholders including the project management team.

1.5 Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS)

- 1.5.1 Nick Johnson is a SABRE registered professional (registration number SLC-026-001) in the categories of:
- 'SQSS'
 - 'Threat Assessment'
 - 'Risk Assessment'
 - 'Security Strategy'
- 1.5.2 SABRE is the only BREEAM recognised third party licensing or registration scheme for "Suitably Qualified Security Specialists".
- 1.5.3 Nick has extensive experience of advising on major strategic security and risk issues at Board level and has utilised his background to develop a successful career in security management consultancy. His experience extends to museums and galleries, universities and higher education colleges, local authorities and national governments, broadcasting authorities, national utilities and in the private sector, multi-national corporations including major international financial groups, property management companies, and leading law firms.




- 1.5.4 Nick is also at registered Technical Expert in the security field for UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service), a past Chairman of the Security and Business Continuity Committee at The British Institute of Facilities Management (BIFM), and a longstanding member and former Marketing Director of the Association of Security Consultants (ASC). The ASC has a professional code of conduct to which members must adhere, maintains a Continuing Professional Development (CPD) register and carries out ongoing peer reviews.

2 Crime and Disorder Statistics


2.1 Location

- 2.1.1 Palmer Park Sports Centre is located in the Redlands / Park Borough within the Thames Valley Police force area. The Sports Centre benefits to some degree from having an 'island-like' status separated from local communities in the sense that it is bordered by two major arterial roads – the A3290 to the east and a major traffic route to the M4 and by the A329 to the west.
- 2.1.2 It is also bordered by the campus of the University of Reading to the south and the University's London Road campus is located within the boundaries of the Redlands / Park Borough to the west.





2.2 Police Reported Crime Statistics

- 2.2.1 In terms of reported crime statistics, the area records a wide range of crime activities with certain crimes such as bike theft and burglary being crimes that typically target a large local student population.
- 2.2.2 Aside from violent crime and sexual offences which represent just over a third of all crime offences recorded in the past year (34%), other crimes reported on a regular basis include anti-social behaviour (14% with an average of 24 incidents per month), criminal damage and arson (11% with an average of 18 incidents reported a month), and burglary (7% with an average of 12 incidents reported a month).



- 2.2.3 Further interrogation of incidents of crime within the ward of Redlands / Park Borough area highlight that there have been no crimes reported specifically on site at the Sports Centre or in the nearby park (Palmer Park) in the past two years.
- 2.2.4 Crimes recorded in the immediate vicinity however, have included several reported incidents of public order, drugs and violence and sexual offences as well as one offence of bike theft, theft from person and criminal damage having occurred on nearby Palmer Park Avenue in the past two years.
- 2.2.5 Incidents reported on St Bartholomew Road have been less and have included occasional incidents of anti-social behaviour, bike theft and violence and sexual offences within the past two years. According to police reported statistics, there has been minimal crime occurring along Wokingham Road.
- 2.2.6 In terms of reporting trends, the Borough reflects a consistent but relatively high level of crime compared to some neighbouring boroughs (such as Earley) with approximately 500 crimes occurring per quarter over the last three years in the area. This is still however significantly lower than reported crime rates in the City Centre in the district covering Reading Station.



2.3 Analysis

- 2.3.1 Although there has been no previous incident of reported crimes having occurred at the Sports Centre or in Palmer Park in recent history, analysis of the crime profile clearly highlights opportunist criminals are operating in the immediate area on a regular basis, and could potentially extend their activities to exploit any perceived opportunities or vulnerabilities with Sports Centre security.
- 2.3.2 The new proposals include a refurbishment of the existing building for similar uses and therefore, it is unlikely to have a detrimental effect on the existing community. However, the additional capacity will attract more members, staff and visitors to the Centre and therefore, there is potential for them to be the victims of crime. If adequate measures are not taken to deter and prevent crime it is possible to foresee that the redeveloped Sports Centre will attract crime.
- 2.3.3 It is acknowledged that the existing Sports Club building was primarily utilised by track and cycle athletes and teams during competition events who are likely to be dedicated members in terms of supporting the Club with limited opportunities for opportunist crime. As this membership is now extended to incorporate swimming pool and soft play / café facilities as well as additional changing room and locker facilities, the opportunity for members to become victims of crime potentially increases.

3 Threat Profile

3.1 Threat Summary

- 3.1.1 The key areas of Threat based on an overview of activities, assets and location are considered to primarily relate to opportunist / minor criminal activity associated from burglary, walk in theft, theft from vehicle and criminal damage (vandalism / graffiti / damage to parked cars etc.) – threats typically associated with public buildings experiencing daily high and fluctuating flows of pedestrian activity.
- 3.1.2 Assets at risk are likely to be personal possessions, centre and staff property. Therefore, relevant physical and electronic security measures should be deployed. Reasonable security processes and policies should also be applied.
- 3.1.3 To a lesser degree, assault on both visitors and members of staff remains a potential threat in any areas that invite members of the public on to grounds and into buildings. This also extends to situations where there is potential in a sporting environment for intense rivalry among specific players / teams and their supporting audiences to come into proximity with each other. Again, reasonable security processes and policies should be applied to deter in the first instance and secondly minimise any impact from associated events from occurring.
- 3.1.4 Sadly, although considered extremely low risk, the threat of terrorism can never be entirely discounted. It is considered that the Park and activities do not present a direct threat from specific and organised terrorist group activities but the threat of a lone 'radicalised' or 'dis-affected' individual using a vehicle as a weapon or marauding weapons attack specifically in outdoor park areas is still extant.
- 3.1.5 Key mitigation measures to address this threat include appropriate landscaping and physical security measures to prevent vehicles driving into buildings or public crowded areas at speed and the ability to lockdown buildings and / or prevent unauthorised assailants to quickly gain full and unimpeded access into buildings.
- 3.1.6 A further breakdown of Threat by activity type and brief reference to design basis threats and mitigation measures is detailed below.

3.2 Burglary

- 3.2.1 The potential for burglary will always be present. It should be noted that most incidents of burglary are opportunist as opposed to pre-meditated. Whilst currently considered a low to moderate risk, the potential resale of IT and sports equipment coupled with the relative seclusion and general 'quietness' of the area especially at night may attract the attention of potential opportunist thieves operating in nearby neighbourhoods into the area. There is also the added risk of associated criminal damage which may significantly impact on business operations in the event of a break in.

- 3.2.2 The primary mitigation measure to address this is to install an intruder alarm to a minimum Grade 2 standard with dual path communications and remote monitoring to an Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) and appointed keyholders to respond in the event of an alarm activation out of hours.

3.3 Opportunist Theft / Theft from Vehicle

- 3.3.1 Opportunist theft covers thieves who seek opportunities and persons who observe an item left unattended and take it. In a Sports Centre environment, this extends from bags and personal items left unattended in café areas or not secured appropriately in lockers in changing rooms to bags and personal items being left on display in parked cars.
- 3.3.2 Some sports equipment such as dumbbells and associated weightlifting equipment have significantly risen in demand and 'resale' value following previous lockdown measures and also present an opportunity for less honest members to potentially steal if it is considered there are minimal security measures or deterrents in place.
- 3.3.3 Mitigation measures to address this risk include providing restricted access control to Club areas via turnstiles / speed gates and access controlled doors to team athlete areas. All members / users should be encouraged to secure personal belongings in lockers with a padlock or key / token system in changing rooms.
- 3.3.4 Consideration should also be given to installing CCTV at key circulation points in the building or outside rooms or areas housing assets of potential resale value such as IT server rooms, sports equipment stores and gym facilities.
- 3.3.5 To mitigate the risk of theft from vehicle, consideration should be given to installing CCTV and appropriate lighting in car parking areas, or alternatively signage erected at prominent positions to inform visitors that they park at their own risk.

3.4 Bike Theft

- 3.4.1 It is noted that there is a regular occurrence of active bike theft operating within the local neighbourhood and which also appears to be seasonal with particular 'spikes' of bike theft being typically reported at the start of the academic year in September. This would also suggest a corresponding second hand bike market to support demand and therefore a bike is an attractive item to steal in terms of resale value.
- 3.4.2 Whilst considered low risk and low impact to the Sports Centre, it is also acknowledged that many Club users will cycle to the Sports Centre and park their bikes in bicycle racks provided and which may in turn attract corresponding thieves.
- 3.4.3 To mitigate this crime, sufficient lighting should be provided to all external bike rack areas to provide good levels of vision throughout to enhance opportunities for natural and technical surveillance.

- 3.4.4 As with theft from vehicle, associated signage should also be placed in prominent locations informing users that they park at their own risk. Should the area become actively targeted by thieves, associated advice and guidance on how to appropriately secure a bicycle with tamper / bolt cutter proof chains and marking bikes with smart water or other property marking system should assist in managing the risk further.

3.5 Criminal Damage / Arson

- 3.5.1 There is an ongoing threat of criminal damage in all places open to the public.
- 3.5.2 Motivation is often unclear and can be for a variety of reasons such 'misadventure' in the case of children / youths but reconnaissance for possible opportunities of theft cannot be entirely discounted. Such damage ranges from graffiti or glass breakages to intention to cause extreme damage such as arson (detailed below).
- 3.5.3 In this regard, accessible outbuildings and storage units which may house potentially valuable items for resale present a risk and should be appropriately secured.
- 3.5.4 Appropriate risk mitigation strategies include ensuring doors are fitted with thief resistant locks to provide effective protection and deter thieves from possible attack or where this is not feasible, fitted with security grade bolt cutter proof chains and padlocks.
- 3.5.5 Any outbuildings considered as business critical should ideally be monitored with door contacts linked to the main building's intruder alarm system. Likewise, further consideration for such buildings should be given to installing general CCTV monitoring the area and / or sensor triggered lighting to alert movement in the area under hours of darkness and provide a further deterrent to any would be assailant.
- 3.5.6 Deliberate acts of arson are extremely rare and usually initiated by an ex-employee or ex-contractor who is harbouring a grudge. Threat from arson aimed therefore directly at the Sports Centre seems highly unlikely.

3.6 Assault

- 3.6.1 Assault on both visitors and staff remains a potential threat in any areas that invite access to the general public and have the potential to attract marginalised / intoxicated persons on to the premises or indeed bring members of staff into conflict with visitors who have been denied access.
- 3.6.2 It is also potentially plausible as highlighted above that rival teams and / or associated supporters may have the potential to inflame a situation should the identity of the other party's existence be made aware to one or both members or a disagreement between parties be allowed to escalate.
- 3.6.3 Apart from any possible injuries and trauma suffered by the victim(s), the potential impacts include serious effects on staff morale (increased absence, etc.) as well as possible litigation.

3.6.4 Whilst the Club is unable to directly mitigate these kinds of risk, it can be vigilant through the observations of the Centre staff to identify any aggressive behaviour or unusual activities of specific members or visitors directed at management or other members.

3.6.5 In terms of potential conflict scenarios, instances of potential conflict between members and staff are most likely to happen at the front lobby concierge desk. For this reason consideration may want to be given to installing either a static discreet panic attack button (also known as a hold up alarm) that relays back to the Manager's office to discretely make them aware of an escalating incident or a wearable panic button to also alert staff of a developing situation.

3.7 Drug Related and Other Illicit Activities

3.7.1 The relative isolation and seclusion of the Sports Centre car park does present the opportunity for low level crime activity to potentially take place out of hours such as drug related or other illicit activities.

3.7.2 To mitigate this risk, it is considered necessary that a vehicle barrier be installed to address unauthorised intruders attempting to gain access out of hours and to act as a visual deterrent. This barrier should be secured with an appropriate British Standard closed shackle and hard steel case padlock and bolt-cutter resistant chain or similar.

3.8 Travellers / Squatters

3.8.1 Although a low threat, there have been reported incidents of travellers having gained access on to public parks, common ground or public car park facilities elsewhere in the country and they could potentially use Palmer Parkway as a means of gaining access on to neighbouring parkland and which in turn could cause significant disruption to the Sports Centre. Again, for this reason a vehicle barrier is recommended.

3.9 Terrorism

3.9.1 It is assessed that the Club and its staff face the same uncertain degree of risk posed by potential fundamentalist action in cities. It is not possible to predict where or when a terrorist attack will take place or what style of attack it will be. It is not possible, therefore, to make specific plans to combat a terror attack. There are, however, some measures that can be taken to reduce the likelihood or impact of a terror attack which are set out below.

3.9.2 The most likely types of terrorist attack against targets are a "bomb" (concealed in a vehicle or worn by a "suicide bomber"), using a vehicle as a weapon or a "Marauding Weapons Attack" (individuals or groups who seek to attack as many people as possible in a roaming attack using weapons such as firearms or knives, or to attack a large event or gathering.)

3.9.3 There have been a number of high profile terror attacks in major European cities in recent years including most notably in Reading earlier this year.

3.9.4 At the time of preparing this report, the current national threat level for terrorism as set by the Joint

Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) has recently risen to **SEVERE**. This means that an attack is 'highly likely' although this escalation in threat level has been primarily a pre-cautionary measure in response to a spate of terrorist attacks having taken place in Europe in recent weeks as opposed to known intelligence specifically targeting the UK.


- 3.9.5 The redevelopment of Palmer Park is unlikely to be a target of a terror attack however the potential for large gatherings of the public at either the Sports Centre or in the surrounding park land may be affected by an incident. Therefore, the management team should prepare a contingency plan to deal with a major incident including a terror attack in the immediate vicinity.
- 3.9.6 Thames Valley Police in common with other forces advocate a "Run, Hide, Tell" policy in response to a terror attack. The following measures support this policy and should be taken into account and included within contingency plans:
- A "lock down" facility should be included in the locking/security arrangements for the building whereby all perimeter doors can be locked quickly and easily from inside.
 - All rooms within the building should be identified from the inside as well as outside so that in the event of an attack, persons hiding in a room can easily and accurately communicate their location to the emergency services.
 - Doors to rooms that include vision panels or are glazed should also include blinds or screens so that attackers can be prevented from seeing persons hiding inside the room.
 - When planning the emergency evacuation procedure for incidents such as a fire alarm activation, DO NOT arrange muster points where large numbers of staff and visitors gather together. Occupants should be allowed to disperse into the local area and alternative methods of communicating, checking in and recalling used, such as text messaging or social media apps.
- 3.9.7 In addition and in response to the recent knife attack incident in Forbury Gardens in June 2020, consideration may want to be given to installing external CCTV at key access / entry points including pedestrian paths leading on to the site.
- 3.9.8 It is appreciated that in the event of a 'marauder' attack or similar incident occurring on neighbouring parkland or in the immediate vicinity outside the Sports Centre any assailant(s) are likely to be hooded and any CCTV monitoring covering the area would not be actively monitored. However, it would provide the Police with further evidence and a visual description of what the attackers were wearing post incident and as part of any ongoing investigations.

4 Design Strategy

4.1 Protection Priorities

4.1.1 Priorities for security protection in this report are based upon the following categories:

- people (staff, members, visitors, contractors, customers, etc.)
- physical assets (buildings, contents, equipment, etc.)
- information (electronic and paper data, etc.)
- processes (critical procedures, etc.) - the actual operational process and essential services required to support it.



4.2 Recommended Security Approach – Protection In Depth and Span

4.2.1 There are four distinct but related principal security objectives that should be factored into the overall security posture and design for a building with multiple activities / functions taking place. The objectives are:

- **Deter** a security attack – either by a discrete profile to avoid untoward interest, or by presenting a 'hard target' image that would cause potential attackers to assess that they would likely be unsuccessful and that the risk to them would outweigh the potential gain, e.g. a high risk of detection, subsequent prosecution, etc.
- **Detect** an attack – effective protective measures that provide timely alerting to threats to enable an appropriate response, e.g. police, security presence.

- **Delay** an attack – effective measures that serve to delay an attack to allow adequate response from emergency services or other responders.
- **Defeat** an attack – effective measures to counter the attack, e.g. withstand forcible attack, stringent access procedures to detect subterfuge.

4.2.2 The security response should be risk-based and commensurate with the assessed threats and consequent risks, and deployed in a manner that does not cause unwarranted impediment to the efficiency of operational business. The protective measures – physical and technical – should be integrated as far as is practicable to achieve a holistic, effective and efficient security posture so achieving defence in depth and span.

4.3 The Way Forward

4.3.1 This report is intended to provide sufficient information to inform the developers and designers appreciation of the likely security situation at the new premises, and the measures that should be implemented to mitigate against the potential threats.

5 Security Needs Assessment (SNA)

5.1 Overview

- 5.1.1 Based on the assessments of Threats outlined in Section 3, this Security Needs Assessment details the requisite design / protection standards to mitigate the threats considered. A summary checklist of recommendations is detailed in Appendix A.

5.2 Separation of Functions and Users

- 5.2.1 Good security is established by providing a layered approach. It is evident that there are four potential zones / layers of protection that should be established for the new development which if consistent, properly configured and maintained will provide protection in depth:

Level 1 – Outer Security Zone

This is represented by the immediate external areas to the Centre covering primary access routes on to the site, car parking areas, any associated outbuildings as well as any external public seating or congregation areas.

Level 2 – Primary Security Zone

This is represented by the Centre's general reception area in the Hub on the ground floor before the entrance turnstiles / speed gates. Access is permitted to all members, staff and visitors.

Level 3 – Secondary Security Zone

These are general Club areas to which members, staff and invited visitors / guests have access, and is considered to include the swimming pool area and associated changing rooms in the Sports Centre building, soft play area, Club café and toilets on the ground floor of the Hub area, gym and associated changing rooms on the first floor of the Hub, and fitness studios and toilets on the first floor of the existing building (athletics building). Access to these areas should be through a controlled security point (speed lane turnstiles or access controlled doors).

Level 4 – Inner Security Zone

This area relates to the ground floor of the existing building only where it is intended for access to be restricted to facilities including changing rooms for teams and respective officials attending sports events and competitions as well as any sports equipment stores and the first aid room. Access will be restricted to specific staff entitled to have access and to visiting teams / sports officials following registration at reception.

Level 5 – Specific Assets

This area will be specific rooms typically referred to as SRAs (Strictly Restricted Areas) such as server / comms rooms and the chemical store for the swimming pool or storage areas for valuable assets (e.g. cash office / Manager's office). Access should be restricted to authorised persons only.

5.3 Physical security

5.3.1 General Requirements

5.3.1.1 The design and construction of the new development should comply with the relevant sections of:

- BS 8220-2: 1995 - Guide for security of buildings against crime. Offices and shops

5.3.2 Doors and Building Components

5.3.2.1 All ground floor fire exit doors, outbuildings, stores and free standing barriers should meet the requirements of:

- LPS 1175, minimum SR2. Requirements of intruder resistant building components

5.3.3 Any inward opening external doors should be fitted with security hinge bolts on the hinge side. Bolts to align with hinges.

5.3.4 Glazing

5.3.5 All accessible windows up to a height of 3.5m should be manufactured and installed to meet the requirements of:

- BS EN 356:2000 P2A. Glass in Building. Security glazing – classification of resistance against manual attack.

OR

- LPS 1270 Issue 1.1 (2014) minimum SR2. Requirements for intruder resistant security glazing units.

5.3.6 A summary of recommended requirements for physical security is detailed in Appendix B.

5.3.7 Hub Entrance Lobby

5.3.8 Primary access to the Sports Centre is via a set of glazed sliding doors leading into 'the Hub' - the main entrance lobby. This set of doors should be on free access during normal public opening hours and should include the facility to lock the doors out of hours as well as a secondary means of mechanically securing the building in the event of a power failure or fault with the primary locking method. Locks should be in accordance with BS 3621: 2017 specification for thief resistant locks.

5.3.9 Consideration should also be given to being able to quickly 'lockdown' or remotely control access from the 'Concierge' desk in the event of a serious incident occurring outside in the immediate area and as referenced in sections 3.6.5 and 3.9.6.

5.3.10 The main entrance lobby enables free access to all other areas of the Sports Centre complex. To prevent intruders tailgating staff or members into Club space areas unchallenged a second secure line of speed

gates or turnstiles is required between the main entrance lobby and internal circulation area leading to the lift / stairwell.

- 5.3.11 Consideration should be given for speed gates or turnstiles to be of sufficient height to deter 'unauthorised' visitors from jumping the barriers, especially if as part of the operations strategy for the Centre, it is considered that the Concierge desk may not necessarily always be staffed during opening hours.

5.4 Access Control

5.4.1 External

- 5.4.2 To deter unauthorised vehicles, travellers or other illicit activities occurring in the grounds or car parking areas out of Sports Centre opening hours / at night, it is recommended that access be prevented by the installation of a barrier across the access road (Palmer Parkway) leading from Wokingham Road.

- 5.4.3 This will need to be either visible from the main road (to deter vehicles from turning into the road) or a turning circle provided immediately in front of the barrier to enable vehicles who have inadvertently accessed to return without reversing on to a potentially busy main road.

- 5.4.4 The barrier will need to meet requirements LPS 1175 and be physically locked / secured so as to provide an additional deterrent to potential trespassers out of hours. It should also ideally be monitored using CCTV so as to provide additional evidence in the event of an incident occurring on site.

5.4.5 Track Gate Access

- 5.4.6 Access to track side externally via the existing dedicated gate will need to be controlled to authorised staff and athletes only. This may be physical utilising mechanical key lock, security rated padlock and chain or a mechanical digilock system or by Electronic Access Control (EACS). It is assumed that the gates would be on free access during Sports Centre operating hours.

5.4.7 Internal Areas

- 5.4.8 An Electronic Access Control system (EACS) should be installed to control access to the building and designated areas within. This should include but not be limited to:

- Member turnstiles / speed gate access
- Doors leading from the 'circulation' area of the Hub to the 'teams' changing areas on the ground floor of the existing building.
- Doors leading from the first floor Studio lobby area into the stairwell that leads down to the ground floor.*
- Exterior doors leading out onto the Cycle and Athletics track from the Hub, and the 'secondary' exit doors leading from the Athletics (existing) building out on to the car park.

- Comms / data / server room

* Noted that this door is also a fire exit route and will therefore require a green 'break glass unit' (BGU) in event of a fire alarm to enable fitness studio users to escape. This BGU should be alarmed so as to enable Sports Centre staff (Concierge / cash office) to be aware if unauthorised access has occurred when a building fire alarm has not been activated.

5.4.9 Other potential areas requiring managed access to authorised users (this may be via either EACS or physical lock and key) and for consideration include:

- Cash Office
- Manager's office
- Other considered strictly restricted areas e.g. cycle store, chemicals store

5.4.10 **Access Control Strategy**

5.4.11 One of the challenges with the building design is to be able to manage access for 'team' athletes and officials to the changing rooms and track whilst preventing other legitimate Sports Centre users from accessing these areas.

5.4.12 Likewise, and depending on the Centre's anticipated access control strategy, it is assumed that the Sports Centre would want to 'manage' Club members (i.e. non-athlete) access on to the track.

5.4.13 To address this, the following design proposals are recommended:

5.4.14 *Doors Accessing Track from the Hub*

5.4.15 If it is determined that gym / swimming pool members and visitors are to be actively discouraged from accessing the track area, it is recommended that the doors leading from the Hub on to the track are put on electronic access control but with the ability to put on free access during periods of heavy track usage and during events. This would require athletes using the track facilities to take a token or card out on the track with them so as to be able to re-enter the building which it is appreciated may not be practical.

5.4.16 Consideration could also be given to installing an intercom and remote door release relay from the Concierge / Reception desk to enable athletes to return to the Hub / changing rooms without the need for taking a card or token out on the track.

5.4.17 It is appreciated that in terms of day-to-day operations, this may also not be practical and therefore the door leading from the Hub on to the track may need to be on free access during Sports Centre opening hours.

5.4.18 Regardless, the door will require to be fitted with door contacts as per any perimeter door (see section 5.7 below) and alarmed on the intruder detection system out of hours and monitored by CCTV.

- 5.4.19 *Doors Accessing Restricted Athletes Changing Areas from the Hub.*
- 5.4.20 Similar challenges present themselves with respect to returning athletes wishing to access restricted changing room areas if they were not issued with a corresponding card or token to access the building.
- 5.4.21 Again the only work round to address this would be for the Concierge or member of staff to be able to 'swipe' an authorised card at the door reader or to press a remote release button to enable them to return to the changing rooms.
- 5.4.22 In terms of current design proposals, an additional 'challenge' with the current layout is that during competitions and events, visiting supporters would require access to not only the track (Hub track doors put on free access) but also to spectator toilets which are located in the restricted athletes area thereby negating any additional security controls in place to restrict access to these areas.
- 5.4.23 The only option to address this and still retain a restricted athlete area would be to relocate the women's spectator toilets to be adjacent or opposite to the men's spectator toilets and install a set of access controlled doors behind the toilets. This would then provide the requisite level of control to enable only athletes to access from the 'public' side of the corridor to 'restricted athlete' areas and respective team changing rooms.
- 5.4.24 *Old 'Main Entrance' Doors of the Existing Building (Athletes area)*
- 5.4.25 These doors are to be retained as a fire exit and only used as an entrance for managed events or to receive emergency services in response to persons seeking treatment in the first aid room.
- 5.4.26 It is recommended these doors are put on electronic access control during the day but alarmed at night when the intruder alarm is set. Exit via these doors would be via a push bar or green right to exit (RTE) button. Entry would be via access control to authorised users only or on free access when managing access as part of an event.
- 5.4.27 *East Wing Exit Doors*
- 5.4.28 These doors refer to the doors that lead out from the east corridor of the existing (athletes) building to the cycle store and route to the track gates.
- 5.4.29 To ensure security is not compromised (i.e. so it is not feasible for intruders to bypass Concierge / reception controls and gain unauthorised access to the building) these doors will also require some form of access control (either electronic or mechanical digilock) to gain entry into the building as well as a secondary means of securing should the primary method fail.
- 5.4.30 For similar reasons as explained with respect to access from the Hub on the track, it may not be practical for athletes to take a token or user card out on the track and then be required to swipe back in to enter the building and the cycle store. Without any appropriate security controls in place, this presents a significant security vulnerability.

- 5.4.31 For this reason, consideration may need to be given to installing a video intercom (see section 5.5) that relays back to the Concierge desk and allows athletes to re-enter the building and return to team changing rooms.
- 5.4.32 As with all other perimeter doors, this would need to be alarmed out of normal operating hours as per intruder alarm requirements detailed in section 5.7 and monitored by CCTV detailed in section 5.6.
- 5.4.33 *Fencing option.*
- 5.4.34 The only other potential option to be able to efficiently manage free flow of pedestrian traffic out via the east wing set of doors but not compromise building security is to install a physical fence line leading from the East wing of the building and curving round to meet just beyond the track side fence.
- 5.4.35 This would enable athletes and supporters to freely exit the building to access the track from this side, as well as return back into the building without compromising security.
- 5.4.36 It is also appreciated that a second set of security gates may need to be installed within the fence line to enable vehicles as and when required to be able to drive up and through the first set of gates at the track side.
- 5.4.37 Consideration should be given for both sets of gates to be monitored by CCTV as detailed in section 5.6 below.
- 5.4.38 *First Floor Fire Exit Doors leading into Stairwell Down to Ground Floor*
- 5.4.39 If it is a clear policy that the ground floor of the building is to be restricted access to teams, authorised athletes and associated officials then there is the potential with current design proposals for fitness studio users to legitimately access the stairwell down to the ground floor as a primary fire escape route and out of the building via the old entrance doors. This therefore also presents a potential vulnerability in that gym members could also gain access to team changing room areas on the ground floor.
- 5.4.40 To address this vulnerability, it is recommended that the doors leading from studio areas on the first floor into the fire exit stairwell be put on access control and normal access restricted to authorised members of staff and contractors only.
- 5.4.41 In the event of a fire alarm, and as with any fire exit doors that are on access control, the doors should release (i.e. be on free access) but provision also be provided for persons to manually exit via the door by the use of a green break glass unit (BGU) or push bar in the event that the doors do not automatically release on fire alarm activation.
- 5.4.42 To prevent misuse by gym users, the push bar or BGU should be alarmed and relayed back to the Concierge or Manager's office to inform them of any unauthorised access through the door. Ideally as this represents a Sports Centre / restricted area access interface, the door would benefit from being monitored by CCTV as a post investigation tool and in the event of an incident.

5.4.43 **System Requirements**

5.4.44 The access control system shall include:

- Full audit trail allowing interrogation of use.
- Individual identification of all users
- Vandal resistant external audio/video call station.
- Electronic locking to all secure spaces to LPS1175 SR1 standard

5.5 **Intercom**

5.5.1 As highlighted above and dependent on the finalised access control strategy, consideration may need to be given to installing video intercom systems relaying back to either the Concierge desk or the Manager's Office (or potentially both) to enable Sports Centre staff to allow athletes to re-enter the building from the track. This is also based on the assumption that there will always be a member of staff working at the Concierge desk during normal Club opening hours.

5.6 **Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)**

5.6.1 The main objective of the CCTV system is to provide monitoring and recording for the purposes of crime prevention and public safety.

5.6.2 **Building Integrity**

5.6.3 As a minimum, the system should be provided to monitor and record activity in the following areas:

- Outside each building entrance / exit
- Reception areas, including front on identification views of everyone entering the building and Concierge / speed gates area.
- All external elevations of the building complex including coverage of servicing area.
- Outside SRAs, e.g. server / comms room and cash office.

5.6.4 **Internal Circulation Routes**

5.6.5 In addition, and for audit / post investigation purposes, further consideration should be given to monitoring key internal circulation routes:

- Ground floor general circulation area monitoring user access to lift and spectator doors leading out on to the track.

- Entry through 'team' changing doors into general circulation corridor on ground floor (to detect tailgating in event of an incident).
- Entry through fire exit doors leading from first floor Studio lobby area into stairwell leading into ground floor 'team' changing room areas (to detect Sports Centre users accessing 'restricted' team areas on the ground floor and in the event of an incident).

5.6.6 **User Welfare / Health and Safety**

5.6.7 With respect to the Centre's duty of care responsibilities and health and safety policy (as opposed to specific security requirements), design proposals may wish to consider additional CCTV monitoring of Sports Centre activities covering:

- Pool hall area
- Soft play / activity area
- Main gym / fitness suite

5.6.8 **External Areas**

5.6.9 The Sports Centre may also wish to consider additional CCTV monitoring of key external areas including but not limited to:

- Athlete Gate providing access on to the Track.
- Any considered business critical external outbuildings or stores.
- Vehicle barrier to monitor unauthorised access to the Sports Centre site out of hours.
- Pedestrian pathway approaches to the Sports Centre.
- Car parking areas.

5.6.10 Note – when installing CCTV in external environments, consideration needs to be given to any associated or nearby lighting sources so as to ensure there are compatible and sympathetic to CCTV requirements.

5.6.11 **CCTV System Requirements**

5.6.12 The CCTV system and use thereof shall comply with:

- BS EN 62676-4:2015 - Video surveillance systems for use in security applications. Application guidelines
- BS 7958: 2015 – Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Management and Operation Code of Practice.

- Data Protection Act. details for which can be found at: <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/cctv/>

5.6.13 Each camera position will have a clear Operational Requirement (OR) and shall provide a clear video image of the area covered by the CCTV monitoring position and record video images for recall and display at a later date.

5.6.14 The system will also include:

- Capability for video recording images to be stored for a minimum of 30 days.
- CCTV cameras for use externally to be colour / mono switching cameras with at least 2MP resolution
- Cameras for use internally to be colour with at least 1MP resolution.

5.6.15 CCTV recording and monitoring equipment should be located in a server room, office or other secure area, the door to which should comply with LPS1175 SR1.

5.6.16 A monitoring and control facility for the CCTV system should be provided at the main Concierge desk to allow Centre staff to monitor activity in and around the building as well as consideration given to installing a monitor / 'slave' PC in the Manager's office.

5.6.17 A summary of recommended requirements for technical security (incorporating intruder detection, access control and CCTV) is detailed in Appendix C.

5.7 Intruder Detection System (IDS)

5.7.1 System Requirements

5.7.2 If the building is intended to be locked and left unattended / unoccupied outside normal operating hours an Intruder Detection system (IDS) meeting BS EN 50131 to at least Grade 2 with dual path signalling should be installed. The system should be designed to generate a verified signal on entry to any accessible part of the building.

5.7.3 The IDS should include:

- Door contacts on perimeter doors (including any roof doors) and sensitive plant spaces including local sounders and programmed as a 24/7 zone.
- Movement detection in ground floor and other accessible areas to detect unauthorised entry.
- Consideration for personal attack button(s) at the Concierge desk
- Dual path signalling.

6 Glossary of Crime Classifications

The recording and classification of crime for statistical purposes is not consistent across all recording organisations. Therefore, certain crimes can be recorded in different classifications by different organisations. The following describes the crimes normally recoded in each classification as used in this report.

Principal Classification	Sub Classification	Description
Anti-social behaviour		Acting in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household.
Arson		Deliberately destroying or damaging property by fire.
Bicycle theft		The taking without consent or theft of a pedal cycle.
Burglary	Burglary in a dwelling	Where a person enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Aggravated burglary in a dwelling	Where a person carrying a firearm or other weapon enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Burglary in a building other than a dwelling	Where a person enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling	Where a person carrying a firearm or other weapon enters a dwelling with the intention to steal or to commit grievous bodily harm.
Criminal damage	Criminal damage to a dwelling	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging another person's home.

	Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging a building other than a home.
	Criminal damage to a vehicle	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging another person's vehicle.
	Other criminal damage	Deliberately or recklessly destroying property belonging to another person not included in the above categories.
Drugs		Possession, consumption, supply of, or the intent to supply, illegal drugs.
Fraud & Forgery	Forgery	The action of creating an exact replica of an object with the intention of deception.
	Fraud	An intentional deception, on most occasions for monetary gain.
Possession of a weapon		Possession of a weapon, such as a firearm or knife.
Public order		Offences or actions which cause fear, alarm or distress.
Robbery		The actual or threatened use of force before or during a theft.
Theft	Theft from a person	Where items are stolen from someone without force or the threat of force. For example, snatching items or pickpocketing.
	Miscellaneous theft	Theft other than from a person, motor vehicle, residential or non-residential property. Includes

		offences such as making off without paying and keeping lost property.
	Shoplifting	Includes theft from shops or stalls.
Vehicle Crime	Theft of a vehicle	Theft of a motor vehicle with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of it.
	Theft from a vehicle	Theft of parts of a vehicle or trailer, or items within it without intending to steal the vehicle.
Violence	Assault without injury	The use of violence against a person without causing injury.
	Harassment	Where persistent threatening or abusive behaviour is directed at a person.
	Violence	Offences such as assault causing injury. Includes grievous bodily harm and common assault.
	Sexual Offences	Offences such as rape and sexual assault.

7 Acknowledgements

In preparing this report we acknowledge use of the following sources:

- Location map – Google maps.
- Crime statistics – Police.uk (UK Home Office) and Thames Valley Police
- Crime breakdown – ukcrimestats.com

8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix A – RECOMMENDATIONS CHECKLIST

Item	Recommendation	Included in design	Included in build
1.	Design complies with BS 8220-2: 1995.	☐	☐
2.	Fire exit doors comply with LPS 1175, minimum SR2.	☐	☐
3.	Glazing meets with BS EN 356:2000 (P2A) <i>OR</i> LPS 1270 Issue 1.1 (2014) minimum SR2	☐	☐
4.	Lock down facility provided to each entrance concierge lobby and consideration for other entry doors into building.	☐	☐
5.	EACS provided to main reception and turn stiles from Concierge / reception desk into buildings.	☐	☐
6.	EACS installed to control access to restricted areas.	☐	☐
7.	CCTV complying with BS EN 62676-4:2015 and BS 7958:2009 to be installed.	☐	☐
8.	IDS complying with BS EN 50131 to Grade 2 to be installed	☐	☐
9.		☐	☐
10		☐	☐

8.2 Appendix B – GENERAL BUILDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
Physical Security:	All walls, doors and accessible glazing to be resistant to forced entry.	To deter threat of forced entry.
Doors	All doors where possible / practical should be solid core (minimum of 44mm thickness) and should be solid timber or solid core construction in accordance with BS 8220: Part 2: 1995 – security of buildings against crime.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
	Where not practical above glazed doors should be fitted with glazing resistant to manual attack of LPS (Loss Prevention Standard) 1270, minimum Security Rating 2 or BS EN 356: 2000 minimum P2A.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
	Any inward opening doors to be fitted with security hinge bolts on the hinge side. Bolts to align with hinges.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Prevent criminals taking doors off hinges or smashing in. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
Glazing	Where bomb threats are considered a risk, glazing in public congregation areas to be fitted with 7mm thick Anti Shatter Film (ASF) that meets bomb blast accreditation GSA Level C (4psi, 30psi/msec).	Ensure security of public when on premises and in event of secondary impact from explosion in near vicinity.
Windows & Skylights	All accessible windows and skylights where permitted be secured by fitting of laminated glazing, bars or grilles.	To deter threat of forced entry and delay attempted entry.
Barriers	Anti-vehicle and anti-pedestrian barriers / bollards or similar obstacles to be installed at all roadway points leading into a building.	Ensure perimeter access is secure and can be strictly controlled.
Locks	Locking system of external doors should be thief resistant and provide effective protection from possible attack. Access control locks should be of equivalent resistance to forced entry or be supplemented by thief resistant mortise locks/internal bars.	In accordance with BS 3621: 2017 Specification for thief resistant Locks

8.3 Appendix C – GENERAL BUILDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNICAL SECURITY

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
Access Control	All external doors / gates to be fitted with two forms of access control mechanism to include two of the following: • Key lock • Dead bolt • Padlock and chain Where practical and when budgets available, doors to also be fitted with: • Electric Strike Lock or, • Electronic Access Control System	• Ensure perimeter access is secure and can be strictly controlled. • Ensure secondary means of operation in event one system is damaged or fails.
	Any external main doors that are fitted with Electric locks / EACS to be interfaced with fire alarm panel	• Ensure quick effective exit in emergency
Intruder Detection System (IDS)	All external access points should have IDS fitted where appropriate to include:	
	• Door contact sensors.	• Alert staff that door has been breached.
	• Movement sensors to be installed where practical in immediate inner area of perimeter door to alert staff and / or Alarm Receiving Centre out of hours that the perimeter has been breached through a confirmed alarm.	• Detect activity in area I doors are damage or door contacts not activated. • Provide secondary verification of alarm activation for ARC to inform key holders or Police if no on-site security presence
	Ground floor and other accessible windows and skylights not fitted with additional physical security measures (e.g. iron bars, grilles, shutters etc.) to be fitted with concealed magnetic contacts.	• Detect actual entry and allow fast response. • Alert staff to potential 'open' windows when system alarmed.
	Consideration: Accessible windows and skylights be internally alarmed by vibration or glass break sensors where practical / feasible.	• To detect actual entry and allow fast response
CCTV	All external access and exit points should be monitored by CCTV to allow for facial recognition	• Provide visual deterrent.

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
	or visual identification appropriate to assessment need at position: • Facial recognition at point of entry • Visual identification on approaches to point of entry. and include:	• Provide evidential material in the event of a serious incident / illicit activity occurring.
	• Individual Operational Requirements (to include GDPR recording retention requirement)	• Provide clarity as to purpose of camera, exact location and set up and field of view for CCTV monitoring.
	• Day / Night capability.	• Enable identification to be possible under all environmental conditions.
	• Consider Visual Motion Detection (VMD) capability depending on situation.	• Enable automated alert, greater operational effectiveness / increased memory capacity.
	• Effective Management controls – procedural systems must be in place with regard to compliance in the provision of evidence and data protection.	• Ensure compliance with BS EN 62676-4:2015 and BS: 7958:2015 - CCTV Management and Operation Code of Practice - failure to do so is in breach of 7 legislative acts. • Provides controls against illicit data downloading, copying or systematic abuse
Lighting	Lighting must be provided to all external doors, operated by photo-electric cell, time switches or passive infrared devices.	• Ensure image quality, no glare, obstruction or interference with CCTV monitoring.
	Lighting sources must be compatible and sympathetic to CCTV requirements. (Note significant light lux level differentials when field of view covering internal lobby and External areas).	
Signage	Signage must be displayed in external and / or public space area informing public, that area is monitored by CCTV cameras.	• Provide deterrent. • Compliance with monitoring and GDPR / Data Protection Act



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