



BREEAM HEA 06
SAFETY & SECURITY
NEEDS ASSESSMENT
[SNA]

Security of Site
and Building
Assessment

For

RIVERSMEAD
LEISURE CENTRE


READING

RG1 8EQ

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Date **20 November 2020**

Approved **Ian Johnson**

Signature

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Ian Johnson', is written over a horizontal line.

Date **23 November 2020**

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
1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

- 1.1.1 This report summarises the Security Needs Assessment (SNA) carried out for the proposed development and relocation of a new sports facility –Rivermead Leisure Centre located on Richfield Avenue, Reading, RG1 8EQ.
- 1.1.2 The Safety and Security Assessment has been carried out by Nick Johnson of IJA Security Consultants (Ian Johnson Associates Limited). As an independent Security Consultant with nearly 20 years' experience, and a member of The Association of Security Consultants, Nick Johnson is a Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS), and has carried out an evidence based Security Needs Assessment (SNA) during Concept Design (RIBA Stage 2 or equivalent).
- 1.1.3 This SNA report details the findings from a review of the current design proposals to identify the security threats and risks and develop this security needs assessment. The report provides site specific recommendations intended for consideration by the design team. It is our expectation that the contents herein will support the planning, design and specifications to ensure the safety and security issues identified are suitably mitigated.

1.2 Development Location

- 1.2.1 Rivermead Leisure Centre is located to the north of the City of Reading. The existing Centre comprises a number of buildings accessed from Richfield Avenue to the south and is bordered to the north by the River Thames. It is the intention to relocate existing sports facilities to a new larger purpose built Leisure Centre.



Source: Google maps



Satellite image of area
Source: Google maps

1.3 Requirement

- 1.3.1 The proposed development includes the demolition of the existing Rivermead Sports Centre and relocation to a bigger purpose built Leisure Centre covering the current car parking area and incorporating a basketball court hall, gym, swimming and diving Pool, fitness studios, café and indoor events / activity area.
- 1.3.2 The existing outdoor play area is to be relocated on to a new site adjacent to the old Sports Centre site and the current play area regressed.
- 1.3.3 It is planned for the existing building located to the west of the new proposed Leisure Centre to be demolished and a new parking area with associated landscaping to be created. Access on to the site and associated parking will not be restricted to just Leisure Centre members and visitors but will also be used by visitors using the football pitches to the west of the proposed development. Some businesses located along Richfield Avenue will also be able to use the facilities for parking and it is intended for the car park area to be a pay and display area managed by the Council.



Proposed Site Plan
Source: Saunders Boston

1.4 The Security Needs Assessment (SNA)

1.4.1 The Security Needs Assessment is a project and site specific assessment of security needs, including:

- Identifying risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the building(s).
- Identifying risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential user groups of the building(s).
- Identifying any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.

1.4.2 Note: this Assessment was conducted in November 2020 during a period when the UK was under a national lockdown due to the COVID-19 crisis and as a consequence was carried out as a desk top assessment based on a review of proposed drawings, online research and discussions with key stakeholders including the project management team.

1.5 Suitably Qualified Security Specialist (SQSS)

1.5.1 Nick Johnson is a SABRE registered professional (registration number SLC-026-001) in the categories of:

- 'SQSS'
- 'Threat Assessment'
- 'Risk Assessment'
- 'Security Strategy'

- 1.5.2 SABRE is the only BREEAM recognised third party licensing or registration scheme for “Suitably Qualified Security Specialists”.
- 1.5.3 Nick has extensive experience of advising on major strategic security and risk issues at Board level and has utilised his background to develop a successful career in security management consultancy. His experience extends to museums and galleries, universities and higher education colleges, local authorities and national governments, broadcasting authorities, national utilities and in the private sector, multi-national corporations including major international financial groups, property management companies, and leading law firms.
- 1.5.4 Nick is also a registered Technical Expert in the security field for UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service), a past Chairman of the Security and Business Continuity Committee at The British Institute of Facilities Management (BIFM), and a longstanding member and former Marketing Director of the Association of Security Consultants (ASC). The ASC has a professional code of conduct to which members must adhere, maintains a Continuing Professional Development (CPD) register and carries out ongoing peer reviews.

2 Crime and Disorder Statistics

2.1 Location

- 2.1.1 Rivermead Leisure Centre is located in the Abbey / Battle Borough within the Thames Valley Police force area. The Borough also covers much of the City of Reading including north and west Reading as well as the City's two main train stations and the City Centre shopping district incorporating both the Oracle shopping complex and Broad Street Mall.
- 2.1.2 The Leisure Centre itself is located in the north of the Borough and is bordered to the north by the natural boundary of the River Thames and by Richfield Avenue to the South.




Site of Rivermead Leisure Centre

Source: police.uk

2.2 Police Reported Crime Statistics

- 2.2.1 In terms of reported crime statistics, it is appreciated that the vast majority of crimes reported in the borough occurred within the City Centre itself as opposed to the area surrounding Rivermead Leisure Centre. Violent crime and sexual offences represent just over a third of all crime offences recorded in the past year (35%).
- 2.2.2 Other crimes reported on a regular basis include shoplifting (10% with an average of 41 incidents per month in 2020 and mainly occurring at the major shopping mall areas), other theft (also 10% with an average of 41 incidents reported a month in 2020), public order (8% with an average of 33 incidents a month in 2020) and bike theft (8% with an average of 35 incidents reported a month in 2020). It was noted that bike theft appears to be a seasonal crime with monthly spikes occurring at the beginning of each academic year in September and when students return to continue University courses.



Source: police.uk

- 2.2.3 In terms of reporting crime trends, the Borough as with many other districts, experienced a sharp fall in crime activities occurring when the first national lockdown was instated at the end of March 2020 but otherwise highlighted a consistent pattern of crime being reported in the area on a monthly basis:



Source: police.uk

- 2.2.4 The Borough also has one of the highest rates of recorded crime in the local area. This is considered to be expected given that the area covers a large section of the City's population and a number of major public congregation spaces such as railway stations and shopping malls which tend to be flashpoints for higher rates of crime incidence.

Crime levels overview
for the last 3 years (from Jan 2018 to Sep 2020)



Redlands / Park Borough
Source: Police.uk

Crime levels overview
for the last 3 years (from Jan 2018 to Sep 2020)



Earley Borough
(University of Reading)
Source: Police.uk

Crime levels overview
for the last 3 years (from Jan 2018 to Sep 2020)



Abbey / Battle Borough
(Rivermead Leisure Centre District)
Source: Police.uk

2.3 Analysis

- 2.3.1 Following a review of police crime reported on 'street level maps' for spatial monitoring and published on the www.police.uk website, it has not been possible to confirm if there have been any specific incidents of crime occurring at the existing site of the Rivermead Leisure Centre. This is because police crime reported 'pins' are only accurate to within 8 individual postcodes from where the pin is marked.
- 2.3.2 Crimes reported as occurring on a regular basis on or near Richfield Avenue in the past two years include twenty seven cases of violence and sexual offences, thirteen cases of 'other' theft, eight cases of vehicle crime, seven cases of theft from person, four cases of bike theft, and one case of burglary.
- 2.3.3 Although crime statistics for the immediate area are low compared to the rest of the Borough, it is clear based on the crime data reported on both the police.uk and crimestats.uk websites that opportunist criminals are actively operating within the area.
- 2.3.4 It is also acknowledged that some police reported crime for the immediate vicinity may also reflect specific incidents that were reported as occurring at a Casino which is located almost directly opposite to the Leisure Centre on Richfield Avenue.
- 2.3.5 The new proposals include the relocation and redevelopment of the sports centre to incorporate more leisure facilities and as such the additional capacity will attract more members, staff and visitors to the Centre. There is therefore the potential for them to be the victims of crime. If adequate measures are not taken to deter and prevent crime it is possible to foresee that the redeveloped Leisure Centre will attract crime.

3 Threat Profile

3.1 Threat Summary

- 3.1.1 The key areas of Threat based on an overview of activities, assets and location are considered to primarily relate to opportunist / minor criminal activity associated from burglary, walk in theft, theft from vehicle and criminal damage (vandalism / graffiti / damage to parked cars etc.) – threats typically associated with public buildings experiencing daily high and fluctuating flows of pedestrian activity.
- 3.1.2 Assets at risk are likely to be personal possessions, Centre and staff property. Therefore, relevant physical and electronic security measures should be deployed. Reasonable security processes and policies should also be applied.
- 3.1.3 To a lesser degree, assault on both visitors and members of staff remains a potential threat in any areas that invite members of the public on to grounds and into buildings. This also extends to situations where there is potential in a sporting environment for intense rivalry among specific players / teams and their supporting audiences to come into proximity with each other. Again, reasonable security processes and policies should be applied to deter in the first instance and secondly minimise any impact from associated events occurring.
- 3.1.4 It is understood that car parking facilities on site will be managed by the Council as a pay and display car park and that it will not be possible to restrict access on to the site out of operating hours as the parking facilities are likely to also be used by businesses and other users located on Richfield Avenue.
- 3.1.5 Reported crime statistics for the immediate area highlight that regular incidents of vehicle crime and bike theft occur in the area (albeit it in low numbers) and therefore also presents some degree of risk.
- 3.1.6 Sadly, although considered extremely low risk, the threat of terrorism can never be entirely discounted. It is considered that the new Leisure Centre and associated activities do not present a direct threat from specific and organised terrorist group activities but the threat of a lone 'radicalised' or 'dis-affected' individual using a vehicle as a weapon or marauding weapons attack specifically in outdoor park areas is still extant.
- 3.1.7 Key mitigation measures to address this threat include appropriate landscaping and physical security measures to prevent vehicles driving into buildings or public crowded areas at speed and the ability to lockdown buildings and / or prevent unauthorised assailants from quickly gaining full and unimpeded access into buildings.
- 3.1.8 For this reason, front reception or Concierge desks should be sited so that members of staff have visible sight of the front entrance and are able to quickly take action to secure the building in the event of an incident outside.

- 3.1.9 A further breakdown of Threat by activity type and brief reference to design basis threats and mitigation measures is detailed below.

3.2 Burglary

- 3.2.1 The potential for burglary will always be present. It should be noted that most incidents of burglary are opportunist as opposed to pre-meditated. Whilst currently considered a low to moderate risk, the potential resale of IT and sports equipment coupled with the relative isolation and general 'quietness' of the area especially at night may attract the attention of potential opportunist thieves operating nearby to attempt to break in out of operating hours. There is also the added risk of associated criminal damage which may significantly impact on business operations in the event of a break in.
- 3.2.2 The primary mitigation measure to address this is to install an intruder alarm to a minimum Grade 2 standard with dual path communications and remote monitoring to an Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) and to appoint keyholders to respond in the event of an alarm activation out of hours. Installing a separate standalone intruder alarm to the same specification requirements should also be considered for the existing demountable swimming pool.

3.3 Opportunist Theft / Theft from Vehicle

- 3.3.1 Opportunist theft covers thieves who seek opportunities and persons who observe an item left unattended and take it. In a Leisure Centre environment, this extends from bags and personal items left unattended in café areas or not secured appropriately in lockers in changing rooms to bags and personal items being left on display in parked cars.
- 3.3.2 Some sports equipment such as dumbbells and associated weightlifting equipment have significantly risen in demand and 'resale' value following previous lockdown measures and also present an opportunity for less honest members to potentially steal if it is considered there are minimal security measures or deterrents in place. Whilst acknowledged this is a low risk this would be an 'inconvenience' to the Centre if occurring on a regular basis.
- 3.3.3 Mitigation measures to address this risk include providing restricted access control to registered sports 'member' areas via turnstiles / speed gates. All members / users should be encouraged to secure personal belongings in lockers with a padlock or key / token system in changing rooms.
- 3.3.4 Consideration should also be given to installing CCTV at key circulation points in the building or outside rooms or areas housing assets of potential resale value such as IT server rooms, sports equipment stores and gym facilities.
- 3.3.5 To mitigate the risk of theft from vehicle, consideration should be given to installing CCTV and appropriate lighting in car parking areas, or alternatively signage erected at prominent positions to inform visitors that they park at their own risk.

3.4 Bike Theft

- 3.4.1 It is noted that there are occasional incidents of bike theft happening in the local neighbourhood. Whilst it is considered a low risk and low impact to the Leisure Centre, it is also acknowledged that many users will cycle to the Leisure Centre and park their bikes in bicycle racks provided which may in turn attract corresponding thieves.
- 3.4.2 To mitigate this crime, sufficient lighting should be provided to all external bike rack areas to provide good levels of vision throughout to enhance opportunities for natural and technical surveillance.
- 3.4.3 As with theft from vehicle, associated signage should also be placed in prominent locations informing users that they park at their own risk. Should the area become actively targeted by thieves, associated advice and guidance on how to appropriately secure a bicycle with tamper / bolt cutter proof chains and marking bikes with smart water or other property marking system should assist in managing the risk further.

3.5 Criminal Damage / Arson

- 3.5.1 There is an ongoing threat of criminal damage in all places open to the public.
- 3.5.2 Motivation is often unclear and can be for a variety of reasons such 'misadventure' in the case of children / youths but reconnaissance for possible opportunities of theft cannot be entirely discounted. Such damage ranges from graffiti or glass breakages to intention to cause extreme damage such as arson (detailed below).
- 3.5.3 In this regard, any accessible storage units which may house potentially valuable items for resale or present a health and safety risk to members of the public should be appropriately secured.
- 3.5.4 Appropriate risk mitigation strategies include ensuring doors are fitted with thief resistant locks to provide effective protection and deter thieves from possible attack or where this is not feasible, fitted with security grade bolt cutter proof chains and padlocks.
- 3.5.5 Any outbuildings considered as business critical should ideally be monitored with door contacts linked to the main building's intruder alarm system. Likewise, further consideration for such buildings should be given to installing general CCTV monitoring the area and / or sensor triggered lighting to alert movement in the area under hours of darkness and provide a further deterrent to any would be assailant.
- 3.5.6 Deliberate acts of arson are extremely rare and usually initiated by an ex-employee or ex-contractor who is harbouring a grudge. Threat from arson aimed therefore directly at the Leisure Centre seems highly unlikely.

3.6 Assault

- 3.6.1 Assault on both visitors and staff remains a potential threat in any areas that invite access to the general public and have the potential to attract marginalised / intoxicated persons on to the premises or indeed bring members of staff into conflict with visitors who have been denied access.
- 3.6.2 Apart from any possible injuries and trauma suffered by the victim(s), the potential impacts include serious effects on staff morale (increased absence, etc.) as well as possible litigation.
- 3.6.3 Whilst the Leisure Centre is unable to directly mitigate these kinds of risk, it can be vigilant through the observations of Centre staff to identify any aggressive behaviour or unusual activities of specific members or visitors directed at Management or other members.
- 3.6.4 In terms of potential conflict scenarios, instances of potential conflict between members and staff are most likely to happen at the front lobby reception area. It is acknowledged that the front desk may not always be staffed but in the event of a member of staff being threatened physically or verbally at the reception / Concierge desk, consideration may want to be given to installing a static discreet panic attack button (also known as a hold up alarm) either at the desk or in the Duty Managers office that relays back to the Manager's office on the first floor and / or to an Alarm Receiving Centre to discretely make them aware of an escalating incident. An alternative would also be to issue staff with wearable panic buttons to also alert Management of a developing situation.

3.7 Drug Related and Other Illicit Activities

- 3.7.1 The relative isolation and seclusion of the Leisure Centre car park does present the opportunity for low level crime activity to potentially take place out of hours in car parking areas such as drug related or other illicit activities.
- 3.7.2 As highlighted elsewhere in this report, it is also acknowledged that car parking facilities will be open for use by members of the public on a 24/7 basis. To provide a further deterrent, consideration should be given to securing the services of a mobile guarding patrol company to carry out routine on-site inspection checks on a nightly basis.

3.8 Terrorism

- 3.8.1 It is assessed that the Centre and its staff face the same uncertain degree of risk posed by potential fundamentalist action in cities. It is not possible to predict where or when a terrorist attack will take place or what style of attack it will be. It is therefore also not possible to make specific plans to combat a terror attack. There are, however, some measures that can be taken to reduce the likelihood or impact of a terror attack which are set out below.
- 3.8.2 The most likely types of terrorist attack against targets are a "bomb" (concealed in a vehicle or worn by a "suicide bomber"), using a vehicle as a weapon or a "Marauding Weapons Attack" (individuals or groups who seek to attack as many people as possible in a roaming attack using weapons such as firearms or

knives, or to attack a large event or gathering.)


- 3.8.3 There have been a number of high profile terror attacks in major European cities in recent years including most notably in Reading earlier this year.
- 3.8.4 At the time of preparing this report, the current national threat level for terrorism as set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) has recently risen to **SEVERE**. This means that an attack is 'highly likely' although this escalation in threat level has been primarily a pre-cautionary measure in response to a spate of terrorist attacks having taken place in Europe in recent weeks as opposed to known intelligence specifically targeting the UK.
- 3.8.5 The redevelopment of Rivermead Leisure Centre is unlikely to be a target of a terror attack, however the potential for large gatherings of the public at either the Leisure Centre, demountable swimming pool or in the new children's play area may be affected by an incident. Therefore, the management team should prepare a contingency plan to deal with a major incident including a terror attack in the immediate vicinity.
- 3.8.6 Thames Valley Police in common with other forces advocate a "Run, Hide, Tell" policy in response to a terror attack. The following measures support this policy and should be taken into account and included within contingency plans:
- A "lock down" facility should be included in the locking/security arrangements for the building whereby all perimeter doors can be locked quickly and easily from inside.
 - All rooms within the building should be identified from the inside as well as outside so that in the event of an attack, persons hiding in a room can easily and accurately communicate their location to the emergency services.
 - Doors to rooms that include vision panels or are glazed should also include blinds or screens so that attackers can be prevented from seeing persons hiding inside the room.
 - When planning the emergency evacuation procedure for incidents such as a fire alarm activation, DO NOT arrange muster points where large numbers of staff and visitors gather together. Occupants should be allowed to disperse into the local area and alternative methods of communicating, checking in and recalling used, such as text messaging or social media apps.
- 3.8.7 In addition and in response to the recent knife attack incident in Forbury Gardens in June 2020, consideration may want to be given to installing external CCTV at key access / entry points including pedestrian paths leading on to the site.
- 3.8.8 It is appreciated that in the event of a 'marauder' attack or similar incident occurring in the immediate vicinity outside the Leisure Centre any assailant(s) are likely to be hooded and any CCTV monitoring covering the area would not be actively monitored. However, it would provide the Police with further evidence and a visual description of what the attackers were wearing post incident and as part of any ongoing investigations.

4 Design Strategy

4.1 Protection Priorities

4.1.1 Priorities for security protection in this report are based upon the following categories:

- people (staff, members, visitors, contractors, customers, etc.)
- physical assets (buildings, contents, equipment, etc.)
- information (electronic and paper data, etc.)
- processes (critical procedures, etc.) - the actual operational process and essential services required to support it.



4.2 Recommended Security Approach – Protection In Depth and Span

4.2.1 There are four distinct but related principal security objectives that should be factored into the overall security posture and design for a building with multiple activities / functions taking place. The objectives are:

- **Deter** a security attack – either by a discrete profile to avoid untoward interest, or by presenting a 'hard target' image that would cause potential attackers to assess that they would likely be unsuccessful and that the risk to them would outweigh the potential gain, e.g. a high risk of detection, subsequent prosecution, etc.
- **Detect** an attack – effective protective measures that provide timely alerting to threats to enable an appropriate response, e.g. police, security presence.

- **Delay** an attack – effective measures that serve to delay an attack to allow adequate response from emergency services or other responders.
- **Defeat** an attack – effective measures to counter the attack, e.g. withstand forcible attack, stringent access procedures to detect subterfuge.

4.2.2 The security response should be risk-based and commensurate with the assessed threats and consequent risks, and deployed in a manner that does not cause unwarranted impediment to the efficiency of operational business. The protective measures – physical and technical – should be integrated as far as is practicable to achieve a holistic, effective and efficient security posture so achieving defence in depth and span.

4.3 The Way Forward

4.3.1 This report is intended to provide sufficient information to inform the developers and designers appreciation of the likely security situation at the new premises, and the measures that should be implemented to mitigate against the potential threats.

5 Security Needs Assessment (SNA)

5.1 Overview

- 5.1.1 Based on the assessments of Threats outlined in Section 3, this Security Needs Assessment details the requisite design / protection standards to mitigate the threats considered. A summary checklist of recommendations is detailed in Appendix A.

5.2 Separation of Functions and Users

- 5.2.1 Good security is established by providing a layered approach. It is evident that there are four potential zones / layers of protection that should be established for the new development which if consistent, properly configured and maintained will provide protection in depth:

Level 1 – Outer Security Zone

This is represented by the immediate external areas to the Centre covering primary access routes on to the site, car parking areas, any associated buildings as well as any external public seating, public play or congregation areas.

Level 2 – Primary Security Zone

This is represented by the Centre's general reception area on the ground floor before the entrance turnstiles / speed gates. Access is permitted to all members, staff and visitors.

Level 3 – Secondary Security Zone

These are general Leisure Centre areas to which members, staff and invited visitors / guests have access, and is considered to include the six-court sports hall, swimming pool area, changing rooms activity zone, café and toilets on the ground floor and the gym, fitness and spin studios, associated changing rooms, toilets and spectator seating areas on the first floor. Access to these areas should be through a controlled security point (speed lane turnstiles or access controlled doors).

Level 4 – Specific Assets

This area will be specific rooms typically referred to as SRAs (Strictly Restricted Areas) such as server / comms rooms, other plant rooms that are considered as requiring restricted and controlled access, and any rooms or areas storing valuable assets (e.g. cash office / Manager's office). Access should be restricted to authorised persons only.

5.3 Physical security

5.3.1 *General Requirements*

- 5.3.1.1 The design and construction of the new development should comply with the relevant sections of:
- BS 8220-2: 1995 - Guide for security of buildings against crime. Offices and shops

5.3.2 *Doors and Building Components*

5.3.2.1 All ground floor fire exit doors, outbuildings, stores and free standing barriers should meet the requirements of:

- LPS 1175, minimum SR2. Requirements of intruder resistant building components

5.3.3 Any inward opening external doors should be fitted with security hinge bolts on the hinge side. Bolts to align with hinges.

5.3.4 *Glazing*

5.3.5 All accessible windows up to a height of 3.5m should be manufactured and installed to meet the requirements of:

- BS EN 356:2000 P2A. Glass in Building. Security glazing – classification of resistance against manual attack.

OR

- LPS 1270 Issue 1.1 (2014) minimum SR2. Requirements for intruder resistant security glazing units.

5.3.6 A summary of recommended requirements for physical security is detailed in Appendix B.

5.3.7 **Hub Entrance Lobby**

5.3.8 Primary access to the Leisure Centre is via a set of glazed sliding doors leading into the main entrance lobby. This set of doors should be on free access during normal public opening hours and should include the facility to lock the doors out of hours as well as a secondary means of mechanically securing the building in the event of a power failure or fault with the primary locking method. Locks should be in accordance with BS 3621: 2017 specification for thief resistant locks.

5.3.9 Consideration should also be given to being able to quickly 'lockdown' or remotely control access of the inner set of doors from the 'Concierge' desk in the event of a serious incident occurring outside in the immediate area and as referenced in sections 3.6.4 and 3.8.6. To effectively achieve this, design considerations should also allow for staff working in the area to have visible sight of the front doors.

5.3.10 The main entrance lobby enables free access to all other areas of the Leisure Centre complex. To prevent intruders tailgating staff or members into Club space areas unchallenged a second secure line of speed gates or turnstiles is required between the main entrance lobby and internal circulation area leading to the lift / stairwell.

5.3.11 Consideration should be given for speed gates or turnstiles to be of sufficient height to deter 'unauthorised' visitors from jumping the barriers, especially if as part of the operations strategy for the Centre, it is considered that the Concierge desk may not necessarily always be staffed during opening hours.

5.4 Access Control

5.4.1 External Areas

5.4.2 To deter unauthorised vehicles, travellers or other illicit activities occurring in the grounds or car parking areas out of Leisure Centre opening hours / at night, and as referenced in section 3.7.2, it is recommended that consideration be given to securing the services of a mobile guarding patrol company to carry out routine on-site inspection checks on a nightly basis.

5.4.3 Consideration should be given to installing CCTV and appropriate lighting in car parking areas, along with signage erected at prominent positions to inform visitors that they park at their own risk and that the area is monitored by CCTV for safety and security reasons.

5.4.4 Internal Areas

5.4.5 An Electronic Access Control system (EACS) should be installed to control access to the building and designated areas within. This should include but not be limited to:

- Member turnstiles / speed gate access
- Any perimeter doors that are likely to be accessed on a regular / daily basis, e.g. external door leading to service area
- Comms / data / server room

5.4.6 Other potential areas requiring managed access to authorised users (this may be via either EACS or physical lock and key) and for consideration include:

- Cash Office
- Manager's office
- Other considered strictly restricted plant room areas.

5.4.7 Consideration may also want to be given to installing access controlled video intercom at Service Area doors that relay back to the Duty Manager or Manager's offices so as to alert management staff to delivery requests being made on site.

5.4.8 System Requirements

5.4.9 The access control system shall include:

- Full audit trail allowing interrogation of use
- Individual identification of all users

- Vandal resistant external audio/video call station if required for service delivery access
- Electronic locking to all secure spaces to LPS 1175 SR1 standard.

5.5 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

5.5.1 The main objective of the CCTV system is to provide monitoring and recording for the purposes of crime prevention and public safety.

5.5.2 Building Integrity

5.5.3 As a minimum, the system should be provided to monitor and record activity in the following areas:

- Outside each building entrance / exit
- Reception areas, including front on identification views of everyone entering the building and Concierge / speed gates area.
- All external elevations of the building complex including coverage of servicing area.
- Outside SRAs, e.g. server / comms room and cash office.

5.5.4 User Welfare / Health and Safety

5.5.5 With respect to the Centre's duty of care responsibilities and health and safety policy (as opposed to specific security requirements), design proposals may wish to consider additional CCTV monitoring of Leisure Centre activities covering:

- Pool hall area
- Main gym / fitness suite
- Activity (children's?) zone

5.5.6 External Areas

5.5.7 The Leisure Centre may also wish to consider additional CCTV monitoring of key external areas including but not limited to:

- Existing demountable swimming pool building.
- Vehicle approach to the Leisure Centre.
- Car parking and cycle rack areas.
- Pedestrian pathway / approach to children's external play area.

5.5.8 Note: when installing CCTV in external environments, consideration needs to be given to any associated or nearby lighting sources so as to ensure they are compatible and sympathetic to CCTV requirements.

5.5.9 **CCTV System Requirements**

5.5.10 The CCTV system and use thereof shall comply with:

- BS EN 62676-4:2015 - Video surveillance systems for use in security applications. Application guidelines
- BS 7958: 2015 – Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Management and Operation Code of Practice.
- Data Protection Act. details for which can be found at: <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/cctv/>

5.5.11 Each camera position will have a clear Operational Requirement (OR) and shall provide a clear video image of the area covered by the CCTV monitoring position and record video images for recall and display at a later date.

5.5.12 The system will also include:

- Capability for video recording images to be stored for a minimum of 30 days.
- CCTV cameras for use externally to be colour / mono switching cameras with at least 2MP resolution
- Cameras for use internally to be colour with at least 1MP resolution.

5.5.13 CCTV recording and monitoring equipment should be located in a server room, office or other secure area, the door to which should comply with LPS 1175 SR1.

5.5.14 A monitoring and control facility for the CCTV system should be provided in a staff / Manager's office to allow Centre staff to monitor and review CCTV activity in and around the building.

5.6 **Intruder Detection System (IDS)**

5.6.1 **System Requirements**

5.6.2 If the building is intended to be locked and left unattended / unoccupied outside normal operating hours an intruder detection system (IDS) meeting BS EN 50131 to at least Grade 2 with dual path signalling should be installed. The system should be designed to generate a verified signal on entry to any accessible part of the building.

5.6.3 The IDS should include:

- Door contacts on perimeter doors (including any roof doors) and sensitive plant spaces including local sounders and programmed as a 24/7 zone.
- Movement detection in ground floor and other accessible areas to detect unauthorised entry.
- Consideration for personal attack button(s) at the Concierge desk
- Dual path signalling.

5.6.4 A summary of recommended requirements for technical security (incorporating intruder detection, access control and CCTV) is detailed in Appendix C.

6 Glossary of Crime Classifications

The recording and classification of crime for statistical purposes is not consistent across all recording organisations. Therefore, certain crimes can be recorded in different classifications by different organisations. The following describes the crimes normally recoded in each classification as used in this report.

Principal Classification	Sub Classification	Description
Anti-social behaviour		Acting in a manner that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household.
Arson		Deliberately destroying or damaging property by fire.
Bicycle theft		The taking without consent or theft of a pedal cycle.
Burglary	Burglary in a dwelling	Where a person enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Aggravated burglary in a dwelling	Where a person carrying a firearm or other weapon enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Burglary in a building other than a dwelling	Where a person enters a dwelling with the intention of stealing or to commit grievous bodily harm.
	Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling	Where a person carrying a firearm or other weapon enters a dwelling with the intention to steal or to commit grievous bodily harm.
Criminal damage	Criminal damage to a dwelling	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging another person's home.

	Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging a building other than a home.
	Criminal damage to a vehicle	Deliberately or recklessly destroying or damaging another person's vehicle.
	Other criminal damage	Deliberately or recklessly destroying property belonging to another person not included in the above categories.
Drugs		Possession, consumption, supply of, or the intent to supply, illegal drugs.
Fraud & Forgery	Forgery	The action of creating an exact replica of an object with the intention of deception.
	Fraud	An intentional deception, on most occasions for monetary gain.
Possession of a weapon		Possession of a weapon, such as a firearm or knife.
Public order		Offences or actions which cause fear, alarm or distress.
Robbery		The actual or threatened use of force before or during a theft.
Theft	Theft from a person	Where items are stolen from someone without force or the threat of force. For example, snatching items or pickpocketing.
	Miscellaneous theft	Theft other than from a person, motor vehicle, residential or non-residential property. Includes

		offences such as making off without paying and keeping lost property.
	Shoplifting	Includes theft from shops or stalls.
Vehicle Crime	Theft of a vehicle	Theft of a motor vehicle with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of it.
	Theft from a vehicle	Theft of parts of a vehicle or trailer, or items within it without intending to steal the vehicle.
Violence	Assault without injury	The use of violence against a person without causing injury.
	Harassment	Where persistent threatening or abusive behaviour is directed at a person.
	Violence	Offences such as assault causing injury. Includes grievous bodily harm and common assault.
	Sexual Offences	Offences such as rape and sexual assault.

7 Acknowledgements

In preparing this report we acknowledge use of the following sources:

- Location map – Google maps.
- Crime statistics – Police.uk (UK Home Office) and Thames Valley Police
- Crime breakdown – ukcrimestats.com

8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix A – RECOMMENDATIONS CHECKLIST

Item	Recommendation	Included in design	Included in build
1.	Design complies with BS 8220-2: 1995.	☐	☐
2.	Fire exit doors comply with LPS 1175, minimum SR2.	☐	☐
3.	Glazing meets with BS EN 356:2000 (P2A) <i>OR</i> LPS 1270 Issue 1.1 (2014) minimum SR2	☐	☐
4.	Lock down facility provided to Concierge / reception entrance into building.	☐	☐
5.	EACS provided to main reception and turn stiles from Concierge / reception desk into inner Leisure Centre areas.	☐	☐
6.	EACS installed to control access to restricted areas.	☐	☐
7.	CCTV complying with BS EN 62676-4:2015 and BS 7958:2009 to be installed.	☐	☐
8.	IDS complying with BS EN 50131 to minimum Grade 2 to be installed.	☐	☐
9.		☐	☐
10		☐	☐

8.2 Appendix B – GENERAL BUILDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
Physical Security:	All walls, doors and accessible glazing to be resistant to forced entry.	To deter threat of forced entry.
Doors	All doors where possible / practical should be solid core (minimum of 44mm thickness) and should be solid timber or solid core construction in accordance with BS 8220: Part 2: 1995 – security of buildings against crime.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
	Where not practical above glazed doors should be fitted with glazing resistant to manual attack of LPS (Loss Prevention Standard) 1270, minimum Security Rating 2 or BS EN 356: 2000 minimum P2A.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
	Any inward opening doors to be fitted with security hinge bolts on the hinge side. Bolts to align with hinges.	- To deter threat of forced entry. - Prevent criminals taking doors off hinges or smashing in. - Provide resistance against a sustained attack.
Glazing	Where bomb threats are considered a risk, glazing in public congregation areas to be fitted with 7mm thick Anti Shatter Film (ASF) that meets bomb blast accreditation GSA Level C (4psi, 30psi/msec).	Ensure security of public when on premises and in event of secondary impact from explosion in near vicinity.
Windows & Skylights	All accessible windows and skylights where permitted be secured by fitting of laminated glazing, bars or grilles.	To deter threat of forced entry and delay attempted entry.
Barriers	Anti-vehicle and anti-pedestrian barriers / bollards or similar obstacles to be installed at all roadway points leading into a building.	Ensure perimeter access is secure and can be strictly controlled.
Locks	Locking system of external doors should be thief resistant and provide effective protection from possible attack. Access control locks should be of equivalent resistance to forced entry or be supplemented by thief resistant mortise locks/internal bars.	In accordance with BS 3621: 2017 Specification for thief resistant Locks

8.3 Appendix C – GENERAL BUILDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNICAL SECURITY

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
Access Control	All external doors / gates to be fitted with two forms of access control mechanism to include two of the following: • Key lock • Dead bolt • Padlock and chain Where practical and when budgets available, doors to also be fitted with: • Electric Strike Lock or, • Electronic Access Control System	• Ensure perimeter access is secure and can be strictly controlled. • Ensure secondary means of operation in event one system is damaged or fails.
	Any external main doors that are fitted with Electric locks / EACS to be interfaced with fire alarm panel	• Ensure quick effective exit in emergency
Intruder Detection System (IDS)	All external access points should have IDS fitted where appropriate to include:	
	• Door contact sensors.	• Alert staff that door has been breached.
	• Movement sensors to be installed where practical in immediate inner area of perimeter door to alert staff and / or Alarm Receiving Centre out of hours that the perimeter has been breached through a confirmed alarm.	• Detect activity in area I doors are damage or door contacts not activated. • Provide secondary verification of alarm activation for ARC to inform key holders or Police if no on-site security presence
	Ground floor and other accessible windows and skylights not fitted with additional physical security measures (e.g. iron bars, grilles, shutters etc.) to be fitted with concealed magnetic contacts.	• Detect actual entry and allow fast response. • Alert staff to potential 'open' windows when system alarmed.
	Consideration: Accessible windows and skylights be internally alarmed by vibration or glass break sensors where practical / feasible.	• To detect actual entry and allow fast response
CCTV	All external access and exit points should be monitored by CCTV to allow for facial recognition or visual identification appropriate to assessment need at position: • Facial recognition at point of entry	• Provide visual deterrent. • Provide evidential material in the event of a serious incident / illicit activity occurring.

Requirement:	Minimum Standard:	Purpose:
	Visual identification on approaches to point of entry. and include:	
	Individual Operational Requirements (to include GDPR recording retention requirement)	Provide clarity as to purpose of camera, exact location and set up and field of view for CCTV monitoring.
	Day / Night capability.	Enable identification to be possible under all environmental conditions.
	Consider Visual Motion Detection (VMD) capability depending on situation.	Enable automated alert, greater operational effectiveness / increased memory capacity.
	Effective Management controls – procedural systems must be in place with regard to compliance in the provision of evidence and data protection.	- Ensure compliance with BS EN 62676-4:2015 and BS: 7958:2015 - CCTV Management and Operation Code of Practice - failure to do so is in breach of 7 legislative acts. - Provides controls against illicit data downloading, copying or systematic abuse
Lighting	Lighting must be provided to all external doors, operated by photo-electric cell, time switches or passive infrared devices.	Ensure image quality, no glare, obstruction or interference with CCTV monitoring.
	Lighting sources must be compatible and sympathetic to CCTV requirements. (Note significant light lux level differentials when field of view covering internal lobby and External areas).	
Signage	Signage must be displayed in external and / or public space area informing public, that area is monitored by CCTV cameras.	- Provide deterrent. - Compliance with monitoring and GDPR / Data Protection Act



BREEAM HEA 06 SAFETY & SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT [SNA]

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